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CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING IN THE
BURGER YEARS
Joel B. Grossman*

THE BURGER YEARS: RIGHTS AND WRONGS IN THE SUPREME
COURT, 1969-1986. Edited by Herman Schwartz. New York: Viking.
1987. Pp. xxv, 293. $22.95.
Dividing the Supreme Court into periods denominated by the
name of the chief justice is a venerable and useful custom, but also a
risky practice if it implies an exaggerated role for the chief justice or
an analytically meaningful segmentation of the Court's work. We may
thus refer to the years 1969-1986 as the "Burger Court" only so long
as we do not forget that it was not, in any predominant way, "Warren
Burger's Court." Likewise, as some (but not all) of the essays in this
collection make clear, some of the conservatizing trends said to mark
the Burger Court were, in fact, merely continuations of developments
and ideas already apparent in the last years of the Warren Court. The
title "The Burger Years" is thus at least an implicit recognition of the
artificial and ephemeral boundaries imposed by the comings and goings of chief justices.
The Burger Years, which began as a series of commentaries in The
Nation, offers a left/liberal perspective on the recent course of constitutional law. It is firm, though not heavy handed, in its ideology; and
light (with a few exceptions) in its analysis. The views of its authors,
most of whom are law profe.ssors and/or liberal political activists, are
predictable. Their common task is to assess (and lament) first, the
degree to which the Supreme Court, after Warren Burger became its
chief, departed from the benchmark decisions and trends of the Warren Court; and second, what these departures might imply for the future of constitutional jurisprudence. The book predates the
controversy over President Reagan's ill-fated nomination of Robert
Bork, and the subsequent appointment of Judge Anthony Kennedy.
But its not-so-hidden concern is clearly what will become of the Court
- and the Constitution - under the stewardship of William Rehnquist. Things can only get worse, or so it would appear.
I

Herman Schwartz's introductory essay offers some analytical in• Professor of Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison. B.A. 1957, Queens College; Ph.D. 1963, University of Iowa. - Ed.

1414

May 1988]

The Burger Years

1415

sight to the mostly uncritical critical perspective of his coauthors.
Echoing the theme of an earlier volume on the same subject, 1
Schwartz suggests several reasons why the Burger Court fell into a
slow but steady drift to the right, characteristically avoiding the cutting edge of ideology rather than engaging in a more direct and explicit repudiation of doctrines which, it was assumed, no credentialed
conservative (and particularly not one appointed by a Republican
president) could permit to continue.
We know that the institutional tradition of stare decisis (however
attenuated at the Supreme Court level), and incremental decisionmaking practices tend to undermine even the most devoted judicial efforts
at radical change. Likewise, we recognize that the appointment process does not always produce the "right Justice." Justices appointed
because it is believed they hold certain views may not hold such views;
or they may not hold them very strongly; or once on the Court, their
views may change. Ideology is not a perfect predictor of subsequent
judicial performance. The judicial role may also liberate ideas and values imprisoned by the dictates of a prior legal or political role, as the
liberalism of Earl Warren, and the (still ongoing) metamorphosis of
Harry Blackmun suggest. Who could have predicted, for example,
that one of the most influential and liberal modern interpretations of
the first amendment would be written by the second Justice John Marshall Harlan?2 Or that William Rehnquist, in his first year as chief
justice, would reject a tenth amendment challenge to taxing and spending clause regulations designed to establish a national drinking age of
twenty-one (and be flanked on the right by Brennan and O'Connor)?3
The view from the bench may, indeed, be very different from one's
views before the bench!
The unexpected moderation of the Burger Court also reflected a
changing external environment. Judges cannot make the world stand
still (and they are not too good at making it move, either!). Decisions
which seem to some critics to be revolutionary and illegitimate (and
crying out for repudiation) may seem much less (or more) so over
time, after their impact has been assessed. Thus, Miranda v. Arizona, 4
despite all the initial prophecies of doom aq.d gloom, has not fatally
undermined the police interrogation process. To be sure, this is partly
because the Supreme Court has narrowed the decision's scope and application. But it is also true that the police have learned to live with
the Miranda rules (and in some unexpected ways Miranda has helped
them); and the Court now accepts that red flag of Warren Court liber1. THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION
2. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
3. See South Dakota v. Dole, 107 S. Ct. 2793 (1987).
4. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

THAT WASN'T

(V. Blasi ed. 1983).
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alism as "strik[ing] the proper balance." 5 Mapp v. Ohio, 6 on the other
hand, while much less controversial at its inception, has become a primary target (and likely victim) of judicial conservatives. This is partly
because conservatives have accepted, or want to believe, distorted estimates of its impact, 7 but also because a significant upgrading of the
law of search and seizure since Mapp has substantially enhanced the
stakes in the exclusionary rule debate. 8
A changing external environment can also influence the Court's
agenda, and thus the parameters within which it can effectively operate. Initial Supreme Court hostility to affirmative action, for example,
has been replaced by a grudging, albeit limited, acceptance that equity
and equality are not implacable opposites, and that moderate affirmative action remedies are consistent with other constitutional values.
Having rejected the Reagan administration position that affirmative
action (including school desegregation) is proper only when it provides
make-whole relief to individuals who have been personally injured,9
the Supreme Court is hardly likely (or able) to reverse the tide of limited affirmative action efforts which are now so widespread in both the
public and private sectors. Having initiated and fostered a legal
revolution favoring gender equality, the Court, even if it were of a
mind to do so, could hardly reverse itself amidst the strong social currents pressing to carry that revolution even further. Having recognized that students, prisoners, and hospital residents have
constitutional rights, the Court is unlikely to tum the clock back to
the "hands off" doctrine of an earlier day, although the Burger Court
did narrow the constitutional protections which members of those
groups now routinely expect and seek to expand. 10 Rights, once set
loose, are very difficult to contain; rights consciousness - on and off
the Court - is a powerful engine of legal mobilization and change.
The recent debates over original intent and derivative constitutional rights, which focused mainly on, but were not limited to, the
right of privacy, did little to damage and much to strengthen the
emerging regime of rights which confronted (and for the most part
5. Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1143 (1986).
6. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
7. See Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the "Costs" of
the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of "Lost" Arrests, 1983 AM. BAR
FOUND. RES. J. 611.
8. See, e.g., Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (The Court tightened restrictions on
searches pursuant to a lawful arrest.); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (The Court
imposed new restrictions on electronic surveillance, and more generally, linked searches to ex·
pectations of privacy.); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (The Court limited warrantless
home arrests.).
9. See Local No. 93, Intl. Assn. of Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986); Local 28 of
the Sheetmetal Workers Intl. Assn. v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 21 (1986).
10. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (Inmates have no fourth amendment protection against searches in their cells.).
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resisted) the Burger Court. The juxtaposition of Judges Bork and
Kennedy reveals little support for original intent as an exclusive theory of constitutional interpretation, and very considerable public support for some constitutional right to privacy, whatever its origins.
What those nomination debates revealed is that most people (and perhaps many judges, too) care little for theoretical niceties and jurisprudential subtleties; what concerns them are specific applications of
those rights which, for reasons of ideology or personal benefit, they
may favor or oppose. Thus the constitutional right of privacy is not in ·
serious danger of repudiation. The Burger Court accepted this, and so
too will its successor.
To whom this right applies, and how it applies, however, remain
controversial and dynamic issues still open to judicial revision. Just as
the Court sometimes sets constitutional boundaries (and goals) for the
society and the political system, so too its effective agenda must reflect
the national agenda and the realities of political dynamics. The Burger Court did not repudiate the liberalism of the Warren Court in
wholesale fashion because the Supreme Court is inescapably part of a
political society which had absorbed and largely sustained the values
to which the Warren Court had subscribed. What looked like judicial
radicalism in the 1960s had become, except to a few die-hard conservatives, mainstream jurisprudence and politics in the 1980s.
One final perspective on the Burger Court's "conservative conservatism" needs to be elaborated; regrettably, it is not addressed in this
book. Not only was the Burger Court operating in a changed, and
changing, policy arena, but it was itself an institution undergoing
modest, but important, structural change that may well have contributed to its conservative "drift." The Supreme Court is, at best, neither
well suited nor often disposed to making sharp doctrinal breaks with
the past. Serial negative incrementalism11 is usually its top speed. But
the 1970s and 1980s witnessed a breakdown in institutional consensus
marked by a sharp increase in closely divided decisions, a proliferation
of opinions, substantial increases in the length of opinions, and extensive footnotes. This was no doubt a response to increasingly complex
and ideologically charged issues generated by the growth of the administrative state and the proliferation of rights and rights consciousness. It was also the practical consequence of a divided Court. But
there has also been a gradual bureaucratization of the Court's internal
procedures marked, most importantly, by an enlarged clerk pool and
substantial enhancement, at least in most chambers, of the clerks' responsibilities. As I have pointed out elsewhere, this is more a
bureaucratization of diffusion rather than of lockstep Weberian hier11. By which I mean the common practice of announcing a constitutional rule but deferring
to subsequent cases to provide a precise operational definition of what that rule means or
requires.
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archy. 12 But it cannot be ignored in explaining the drift of the Burger
Court. The Burger Court's lack of a clear ideological direction was
thus rooted in changing institutional norms as well as in judicial traditions, a divided bench, and external political reality.
II

What were the main currents of doctrinal evolution and constitutional thinking in the Burger years? Supreme Court policymaking
rarely produces clear policy statements or guidelines for implementation of its decisions. Few decisions are as specific as Miranda in spelling out just what has been decided, what must be done, and who is to
do it. This encourages reliance on conventional doctrinal analysis,
which conveniently focuses on what the justices have said in a few
leading cases, with little regard for process or context. Unfortunately
that is what most of these essays entail.
Nevertheless, several cross-cutting themes emerge. One is the importance of the Burger Court's effort to contain and modify efforts to
relax the rules governing access to the federal courts. Another is its
persistent effort, in a number of policy areas, to blunt the cutting edge
of Warren Court liberalism by reducing the scope of federal judicial
intervention to enforce constitutional rights.
As to the first theme, Burt Neuborne and Herman Schwartz (pp. 3,
177) both argue that there was a mixed record of decisions regarding
access to the federal judiciary to claim or protect constitutional rights.
Access rules, which are often expressed conceptually as matters of jurisdiction or justiciability, go to the very heart of the judicial function
and our understanding of the Supreme Court's proper role. Is it the
Court's job merely to decide disputes between adverse parties, or does
it have a broader "public law" function of expounding (perhaps even
creating) and protecting constitutional rights? Is its role to be justified
and its legitimacy derived solely or primarily by fidelity to the traditional rules of bipolar constitutional adjudication, or is it to be evaluated by some external measure of function or outcome? 13
It is possible to read the Burger Court's record in two ways. There
can be little doubt of its predisposition to refashion traditional limits
on the ability of taxpayers and citizens to employ the courts for a general airing of political grievances, i.e., to "challenge the system." The
Court not only limited the briefly emergent taxpayer standing doctrine
12. See J. GROSSMAN, SOME THOUGHTS ON THE EVOLUTION OF THE SUPREME COURT'S
ROLE AND STRUCTURE (1985).
13. See Grossman, Judicial Legitimacy and the Role of the Courts, 1984 AM. BAR FOUND.
RES. J. 214 (reviewing M. SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS
(1981)) and sources cited therein, especially: Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976); and Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term - Foreword:
Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1982).
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of Flast v. Cohen 14 but even tightened, at least rhetorically, traditional
standing doctrine by adding to it "injury in fact" and "causation in
fact" requirements. 15 The justiciability doctrine of political questions,
which had been substantially narrowed by the Warren Court, seemed
likely to take on new life (though never, I think, to return to its preBaker incarnation). 16 And the Burger Court erected a high barrier
against federal habeas corpus review of constitutional issues in state
criminal trials. 17
Access is affected not only by doctrines of jurisdiction and justiciability, but also by certiorari practices, substantive rules and constitutional interpretations, and remedial doctrines. Empirical studies
have shown more than a tendency for Supreme Court justices to grant
review primarily to reverse lower court decisions they believe to be
erroneous. 18 In the Burger Court, there was a clear pattern of granting review in criminal cases to prosecutors challenging the reversal of
convictions by the lower courts (often their own state supreme courts),
and, reversing the pattern of the Warren Court, few grants to defendants seeking review of their convictions.
Reversal of substantive doctrinal trends may also be a signal to
potential litigants that certain cases and issues are likely (or very unlikely) to be selected for review. The post-1930s consensus against
economic substantive due process, for example, has been strictly enforced by refusing to take cases challenging state economic regulations, a pattern continued by the Burger Court. Potential challenges
to official authority have been limited by curtailment of the expansion
of the state action doctrine, 19 by setting high barriers of immunity for
some (though not all) political officials,20 by limiting the occasions for
federal court intervention in state court proceedings, 21 and by attempts to revive the eleventh amendment to ward off constitutional
challenges to state policies.22
Likewise, the Burger Court's decisions on major criminal justice
issues, including capital punishment and prisoners' rights, must certainly suggest to those target groups that relief from the current
14. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
15. E.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
16. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
17. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
18. D. PROVINE, CASE SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME CoURT (1980);
Provine, Deciding What to Decide: How the Supreme Court Sets Its Agenda, 64 JUDICATURE 320
(1981).
19. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. lrvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). See also Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436
U.S. 149 (1978).
20. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
21. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and its progeny.
22. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
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Supreme Court is unlikely (although they are peculiarly unlikely to be
dissuaded from seeking review). While not repudiating the basic principles of Brown v. Board ofEducation 23 and Baker v. Carr, 24 the Court
has cut back on available remedies for, and judicial intervention to
protect against, violations of those decisions. 25 Overall, the Court
made it clear that it would not be hospitable to certain kinds of constitutional claims and thus to certain classes of claimants.
The Burger Court did not uniformly close all courthouse doors to
nontraditional litigants. It often permitted an expanded judicial review of administrative agency decisions, which not only benefited environmentalists and those challenging nuclear power, but also those
challenging restrictions on private property. And, often over the opposition of the Chief Justice, it did substantially enhance remedial opportunities for those seeking redress for violations of constitutional
rights.
Neubome (p. 3) argues that, on balance, the Burger Court favored
the more traditional, and restrictive, rules of access, and the more limited judicial role which those rules serve. I think he is essentially correct. But if our baseline is the 1950s instead of the 1960s, then the net
result of the Warren and Burger Court decisions has been substantially to enlarge access to the federal courts. It seems highly unlikely
that even the Rehnquist Court would return us all the way to the
much narrower private law view of standing and of which issues are
appropriate for Supreme Court consideration.
Like Neubome, I prefer a more flexible, open-ended view of the
Court's function, and an expanded conception of access which is sensi. tive to nontraditional litigants and causes. It is, in my judgment, the
only tenable position for the Supreme Court of the 1980s (leaving
aside questions of particular doctrines). Constitutional rights and values ought not to be merely instrumental means of resolving .disputes
selected for decision by essentially technical criteria, but instead
should be aspirations of a liberal polity to which the Supreme Court
can make more than a modest contribution. On the other hand, in
order for the Supreme Court to function effectively as a policymaker it
must also be seen as a court. Its legitimacy can never rest entirely on
the outcome of its decisions. I share Neubome's rejection of a rigid
''Marbury" model of adjudication, 26 but he does fail to address the
23. Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Brown v. Board of Educ.
(Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
24. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
25. Of course, this retrenchment has been countered by efforts to bypass the Supreme Court
by reliance on state law and state constitutions, which state supreme courts can interpret more
liberally than the federal constitution. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
26. Pp. 1-5. It is clear what Neubome means by a Marbury model of adjudication, but it is
an apt metaphor only because it has come to be used that way. Technically speaking, Neuborne
is correct; the decision turned on a hypertechnical reading of article III limitations on the
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necessary question of limits. Is he urging adoption of the William 0.
Douglas position that all citizens should be allowed, more or less without restraint, to become private attomeys-general?27 Surely not; but
then who should have standing to litigate in the federal courts? What
kinds of cases should be allowed - encouraged? Is there room in our
constitutional scheme for a constitutional "cop-·out" such as the political questions doctrine? This is not the forum to answer those questions, but clearly they must be addressed in any complete assessment
of the Burger Court.
A second theme of these essays might be labeled "phased regression from the liberal norm of federal judicial intervention to protect
constitutional rights." The strategy of the Burger Court (if strategy is
the right word) was in many instances to accept the basic principles of
major Warren Court decisions while at the same time altering their
meaning and/or undermining their remedial force and applicability.
Thus, while Brown has been deified, its engine has stalled; the Supreme
Court has clearly orchestrated a policy of federal court disengagement
from the desegregation arena. Justice Brennan's updating of Brown in
Green v. County School Board, 28 which required evidence of achievement of a "unitary, nonracial school system" in de jure segregated
systems, was subsequently diluted in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education to permit a significant number of one-race
schools. 29 Thus a school child does not have an enforceable constitutional right to attend an integrated school (the word integration is, of
course, never used), but only the right to attend a school in a system
which nominally meets the Green-Swann standard. The equitable
powers of federal judges to fashion appropriate desegregation remedies
also have been limited; interdistrict busing strongly disfavored; and
maintaining integrated schools in the face of white flight substantially
impeded by linking continued judicial surveillance to proof of discriminatory intent or purpose.
The Burger Court did reject the Reagan administration position
that school desegregation plans be not only halted, but undone. But
the Court was clearly prepared to witness a substantially diminished
desegregation imperative. It is, in fact, likely that maximum school
desegregation in the United States has been achieved, and that we have
begun (and apparently will tolerate) a steady retreat from the high
point of the late 1970s, when about forty percent of America's school
children (slightly more in the south than in the north) attended more
Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. Given that the power of judicial review is not mentioned
in the Constitution, however, Marshall's purpose was obviously to transcend article III and incorporate into the Constitution a much broader conception of judicial power. Thus, Marbury
stands more for a broad than for a limited interpretation of judicial power.
27. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 107 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring).
28. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
29. 402 U.S. 912 (1971).
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than nominally integrated schools. 30 After Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II), 31 when the Court said that a court-ordered plan that emphasized resources for the black schools and remedial teaching efforts
rather than aggressive desegregation was responsive to "the condition
which offends the Constitution," 32 and thus met the Swann version of
Brown, some observers said that the Supreme Court was countenancing a return to a benign (but perhaps more insidious) version of the
"separate-but-equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson. 33 I think that,
tragically, that is what has happened.
One finds a similar strategy of judicial disengagement in the 1970s
reapportionment cases (which, inexplicably, are omitted from discussion in the book), and in the Court's "deconstitutionalization" of Miranda and Mapp. As Yale Kamisar (p. 143) has noted, the Burger
Court's strategy has been to chip away at Miranda, excising those requirements not specifically supported by the original facts of the case,
and then holding that the Miranda rules were not themselves of constitutional dimension, but merely prophylactic devices designed to enforce the fifth amendment. New "public safety" and "inevitable
discovery" exceptions have been adopted, 34 but, almost inexplicably,
the Court has now announced that Miranda, in its new slimmed down
version, strikes the proper balance. The exclusionary rule announced
in Mapp v. Ohio is under greater attack, and seems more likely to be
repudiated. It has also been downgraded to a mere prophylactic rule;
and the good faith exception, 35 at the moment linked only to the warrant requirement, seems a likely precursor to full excision.
Similar examples of the Burger Court's incremental restructuring
of liberal constitutional doctrine by reducing judicial policy intervention are found throughout the book. The three-part Lemon 36 test for
determining an unconstitutional establishment of religion is a likely
candidate for judicial surgery. The same can be said for the doctrine
that the first amendment is not limited primarily to the protection of
political speech, and that with some exceptions such as libel and obscenity, all expression is of equal value. Lyle Denniston's essay (p. 23)
neatly points out how the New York Times v. Sullivan 37 case might be
used by its opponents to bring about what would be a major regression
in first amendment doctrine. Indeed, reinvigoration of the "two-level"
theory of first amendment protections, all but lost in the modem lib30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

C. BULLOCK & C. LAMB, IMPLEMENTATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS POLICY 55-92 (1984).
433 U.S. 267 (1977).
433 U.S. at 282.
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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eral sweep toward a near absolutist interpretation, seems a very likely
possibility.
For the sake of accuracy it must be conceded that judicial disengagement was not the exclusive denominator of the Burger Court.
That Court is almost entirely responsible for the legal revolution in
gender equality (although critics contend that it did not go far enough
to eliminate gender inequality). It fostered the movement to extend
constitutional rights to prison and hospital inmates - before pulling
back in several recent decisions. It extended the right of privacy to
abortions, and notwithstanding some concessions made to governmental restrictions on funding abortions, maintained that doctrine under
extreme pressure. Until Bowers v. Hardwick 38 it even seemed to be
developing a doctrine of "sexual due process" to protect the autonomy
of private decisions in matters of sexual preference.

III
Constitutional policymaking is a continuous enterprise. It seems
appropriate, therefore, to conclude this essay with some observations
on trends likely to have long-term consequences which have not yet
been fully articulated in the Burger years. Most obvious on the doctrinal side of the ledger is the growing reenchantment with private property (and disenchantment with its regulation) and the emergence, or
resuscitation, of doctrinal thinking designed to restore its legal and
constitutional primacy. There were certainly some hints of this in the
Burger years in efforts to revive the contract clause, and in keying
some first amendment decisions to property rights. Justice Scalia's
opinion last year in the California beachfront case39 forecasts continued movement in this direction. Challenges to the delegation of power
doctrine, which is central to the legal structure of the administrative
state, are also on the horizon. The administrative state is not likely to
fall, but its scope and authority to regulate have certainly become
more vulnerable to restriction, and its primacy is no longer
unchallengeable.
Two other trends should be noted. First, there is the increasing
empirical base of constitutional litigation. The Burger Court did not
welcome, and certainly did not embrace, this development, but its
march seems inexorable. What is the probative value of systematic
statistical evidence, and to what extent should the determination of
constitutional rights depend on it? Constitutional law - good constitutional law - after all, depends as much on valid observations about
the nature of society and human behavior as it does on textual interpretation. The Burger Court made some effort to incorporate empiri38. 107 S. Ct. 29 (1986).
39. Nollan v. California Coastal Commn., 107 s. Ct. 3141 (1987); See R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS:
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).
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cal observations into its decision in the jury-size cases,40 but shied
away from serious empirical inquiry in other cases, such as the deterrent value of capital punishment.41 The Rehnquist Court's decision in
McCleskey v. Kemp rejected a statistically-based equal protection challenge to the death penalty, although it did not dismiss it out of hand. 42
Cases generated by the Meese Commission Report on Pornography on
the alleged harms of sexual violence will once again necessitate consideration of social science data and its implications. Ultimately the
Court will have to come to terms with a form of knowledge which has
achieved increasing legitimacy in the social and political worlds.
Legal empiricism began with the "Brandeis Brief" largely as a liberal
effort to challenge traditional conservative legal doctrines. But increasingly it has transcended ideology and been embraced by advocates for conservative causes. As a new generation of justices, trained
in statistics and comfortable with social science, reaches the bench,
much orthodox legal and constitutional thinking will need to be
reexamined.
Second, the empirical basis of constitutional jurisprudence has already begun to be tested in the Court's largely formalistic, and increasingly surrealistic, view of the political system. Recent decisions about
party primaries and conventions, and political gerrymandering, have
brought the Court into closer contact with the electoral system; 43 decisions about campaign contributions and their regulation have implicated the larger political system. 44 In each of these cases, as with the
early reapportionment cases, the Court has been forced to make empirical assumptions about the operation of our political system that
many have found unsatisfactory. A complete assessment of the Burger years will need to recognize both phenomena: the expanding constitutional framework of politics, and the growing empiricism of
constitutional litigation.

40. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 232-39 (1978).
41. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186 (1976) (Stewart, J., plurality opinion).
42. 107 S. Ct. 3199 (1987).
43. See, e.g., Tashjian v. Republican Party, 107 S. Ct. 544 (1986); Davis v. Bandemer, 478
U.S. 109 (1986).
44. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).

